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United States v. Gerard, a recent case from the Northern District of Indiana, demonstrates how a tax lien, once attached, can stay with property even after the property is conveyed to someone other than the taxpayer.  In 1990, a husband and wife named Robert and Cynthia Gerard bought a residence as tenants by the entirety.  Although the Gerards bought the residence together, Robert paid at least 90% of the purchase price.  Between 2003 and 2008, Cynthia owned a business with outstanding employment and unemployment taxes.  The Gerards and the government generally agreed that the assessments for these tax liabilities attached to Cynthia’s interest in the property.  As time went on, Robert and Cynthia decided to convey the property solely to Robert.  The deed stated that the conveyance was “by way of gift and without any consideration other than for love and affection.”

The government, however, still wished to enforce the liens.  Litigation ensued, and the government moved for summary judgment.  The key issue was whether the liens that were attached to Cynthia’s interest in the property survived the severance of the tenancy by the entirety.  Section 6323 provides that a lien is not valid against a purchaser until the IRS files proper notice.  Thus, according to the court, Robert would not be liable for Cynthia’s outstanding tax balance if Robert was a “purchaser.”  A “purchaser” is “[a] person who, for adequate and full consideration in money or monies worth, acquires an interest (other than a lien or security interest) in property which is valid under local law against a subsequent purchaser without actual notice.”  IRC § 6323(h)(6).  “Adequate and full consideration in money or money’s worth” is “a consideration in money or money’s worth having a reasonable relationship to the true value of the interest in property acquired.”  Treas. Reg. § 301.6323(h)-1(f)(3).

The Gerards argued that Robert was a purchaser because Cynthia used marital assets to pay her business’s expenses and then transferred her interest in the property in repayment of those debts.  The government, however, pointed out that the deed specifically stated that the transfer was made “by way of gift and without any consideration other than for love and affection,” and that any consideration would have been past consideration, which was insufficient.

The court was not concerned that the deed stated that the property was a gift.  It noted that “[i]t is a well-known fact that often a conveyance recites a nominal consideration whereas the true consideration is not nominal.  It is therefore never certain that the recited consideration is the true consideration.”  Clark v. CSX Transp., Inc., 737 N.E.2d 752, 759 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).  The court was, however, concerned with the fact that the parties agreed that the use of marital assets to pay Cynthia’s business expenses was “past consideration.”  Under the regulations, “adequate and full consideration” includes past consideration only if, “under local law, past consideration is sufficient to support an agreement giving rise to a security interest. . .”  Treas. Reg. § 301.6323(h)-1(a)(3); (f)(3).  Accordingly, the court turned to Indiana law to determine whether past consideration could create a security interest.

The Gerards could not cite any Indiana authority indicating that past consideration gives rise to a security interest.  Also, other federal courts hold that past consideration does not make a party a “purchaser” under section 6323(a).  See, e.g., United States v. Register, 727 F. Supp. 2d 517, 526 (E.D. Va. 2010).  Thus, the court concluded that Robert was not a purchaser under section 6323(a) and that the liens attached to Cynthia’s interest in the property survived the conveyance.

The parties still disputed the extent to which the liens attached to the property.  The government argued that the liens remained attached to a one-half interest in the property.  The Gerards, however, argued that Cynthia’s actual interest was worth less than one-half of the property when it was conveyed, so the liens only attached to something less than a one-half interest.  Here again, the court found that Indiana law did not support the Gerards’ argument.  For example, in Radabaugh v. Radabaugh, the court held that the trial court erred by “conclud[ing] that appellee was the owner of less than an undivided one-half interest in the mortgage loan” for real estate owned by a husband and wife as tenant by the entirety.  35 N.E.2d 114, 115-16 (Ind. Ct. App. 1941).  Thus, the court concluded that the liens were still attached to one-half of Robert’s interest in the property, even after the conveyance.

 

The White House released a statement on February 8, 2018 that President Trump nominated Charles Rettig as the new Commissioner of Internal Revenue Code for the remainder of a five year term that began in November 2017.  Unlike other recent presidential nominees that may have ignited fierce debate among political parties, Rettig’s nomination has been universally praised across party lines and by both the public and private sector of tax practitioners.  Rettig spent over thirty-five years in private practice defending clients against the IRS, but also recently published an article discussing the pitfalls of tax collection today and encouraging greater tax enforcement.  Although Rettig’s professional experience is in the private sector, he has consistently encouraged and advocated for voluntary tax compliance and tax enforcement.  Rettig will likely bring this perspective to his new position as IRS Commissioner.

Professional Experience

Rettig spent the last thirty-five years at Hochman, Salkin, Rettig, Toscher & Perez, P.C. in Beverly Hills, California representing clients in a variety of tax matters.  His peers and other national sources have deemed Rettig as a leading practitioner in tax fraud, tax law, and tax litigation and controversy.  See Charles P. Rettig, Biography, Hochman, Salkin, Rettig, Toscher & Perez, P.C.  Throughout his career, Rettig represented thousands of individual, business, and corporate taxpayers involved in civil examinations, tax collection matters, and criminal tax investigations, often representing clients against the IRS.

Concurrent to defending clients in tax matters, Rettig was appointed by the IRS to serve as Chair of the IRS Advisory Counsel (“IRSAC”), and was an active member since 2008.  The IRSAC receives commentary from the public regarding the public’s perception of IRS activities.  The IRSAC then advises the IRS Commissioner on its findings to encourage the public’s involvement regarding tax administration policy, programs, and initiatives.  See Internal Revenue Service Advisory Council Facts, IRS.

With Rettig’s professional backdrop in mind, an analysis of Rettig’s recent publication regarding IRS tax enforcement paints a full picture of Rettig’s viewpoints.  These viewpoints will most likely follow Rettig to his position as IRS Commissioner.

Viewpoint on the IRS and Tax Enforcement

In a fall 2017 issue of the Journal of Tax Practice and Procedure, Rettig published an article entitled A Lesson in Accountability and IRS Enforcement.  Overall, Rettig sets a tone for the need for a new era of increased tax enforcement. The article addresses three main areas: (1) facts on the IRS and current tax collection efforts; (2) the underlying causes of the problems with tax collection and enforcement; and (3) proposed solutions to increase tax collection.

Tax Facts

After providing statistics on the billions of tax dollars collected by the IRS, Rettig explains the current tax gap.  The gross tax gap is the difference between the amount of tax imposed on taxpayers in any given year and the amount that taxpayers voluntarily and timely pay.  The gross tax gap from 2008 to 2010 is about $458 billion.  The net tax gap is the portion of the gross tax gap that never gets paid.  It is the gross tax gap less the tax that the IRS will subsequently collect, either through voluntary payments or IRS enforcement.  Rettig says that it is estimated that the IRS will be able to collect $52 billion of the gross tax gap, leaving a net tax gap of $406 billion.

Problems with Closing the Tax Gap

Rettig addresses three issues that lead to the tax gap.  First, Rettig explains the direct causes of the tax gap: underreporting income, underpaying taxes owed, and not filing taxes at all.  Of those three, underreporting accounts for the greatest portion of the tax gap: $387 billion.  Underpayment accounts for $39 billion and non-filing accounts for $32 billion.  In addressing underreporting, Rettig explains that IRS research shows that people that have federal taxes withheld from income report 99% of their income.  Taxpayers that have reporting requirements under the law also tend to report almost all of their income (96%).  The problem lies with taxpayers that are not subject to withholding or information reporting, with that group only reporting only 68% of their income, and sole proprietors often reporting only 48% of their income.

Second, Rettig highlights that the IRS currently has a historically low number of enforcement agents, which is most likely attributable to the IRS budget.  Rettig cautions that the resource-challenged IRS impacts tax enforcement efforts, which in turn explains another contributing factor to the billion dollar tax gap.

Lastly, Rettig explains that the IRS relies on voluntary compliance.  Rettig states that research shows that increasing civil tax penalties do not increase voluntary compliance by taxpayers.  With IRS examination of taxpayers operating at low rate, Rettig suggests that this may only encourage tax payers to “push the compliance envelop” because it seems like there is not much risk of detection from the IRS.

Proposed Solutions to Close the Tax Gap

Rettig offers three solutions that will target this billion dollar tax gap.  First, Rettig suggests that the IRS should “hunt” for under-reporters and non-filers.  He suggests that technology can help target the taxpayers that fall in the categories of significant underreporting through electronic programs designed to identify these tax payers.  Technology can also be used to identify those tax payers that underreport foreign income, with the cooperation of foreign governments.

Second, Rettig discusses the need for tax practitioners to enhance professional responsibilities within their own fields.  Although the IRS is the governmental tax enforcement agency, Rettig suggests that tax practitioners also play an important role in the voluntary compliance aspect of our tax system.  Specifically, Rettig states that attorneys, accountants, and other tax practitioners must make sure their clients follow the law and observe the appropriate standards set within each profession.  Rettig states, “Tax returns are not to be perceived as an offer to negotiate with the government–information set forth on a tax return, signed by a paid return preparer, must be accurate with a reasonable foundation and reasonable support for the characterization of items set forth within the return.”

Lastly, Rettig suggests that the only way to increase voluntary tax compliance is to increase tax enforcement.  If tax payers know that there is a significant risk of IRS detection associated with underreporting, underpayment, or non-filing, tax payers will be more likely to voluntarily comply.  Because Rettig stated that research shows that increased civil penalties alone do not create the needed effect of increased compliance, only increased tax enforcement through civil examination, field (in-person) examination, and investigation will create the needed effect of increased voluntary compliance by taxpayers.

Conclusion

In sum, Rettig offers both sides of the coin: extensive experience in advocating from the taxpayer’s point of view against the IRS and extensive experience with the inner workings of the IRS and the contributing factors to the billion dollar tax gap.  With this two-sided experience, taxpayers can expect a new frontier of the IRS focusing its resources on targeting the greatest causes of the tax gap, increasing examination of these taxpayers, and hopefully adding millions, if not billions, of uncollected tax revenue to the federal treasury.

In United States v. Stein, the Eleventh Circuit recently decided a novel – but critical – issue for taxpayers.  It held that an affidavit that satisfies Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the summary judgment rule) may create an issue of material fact precluding summary judgment, even if it is self-serving and uncorroborated.  The case centered around an IRS assessment.  IRS assessments are entitled to a presumption of correctness, which can be a difficult burden for taxpayers to overcome.

In 2015, the government sued Estelle Stein for outstanding tax assessments, late penalties, and interest for the 1996 and 1999-2002 tax years.  The government moved for summary judgment and tried to show that Ms. Stein had outstanding tax assessments by submitting her federal tax returns, account transcripts, and an affidavit from an IRS officer.  Ms. Stein responded with her own affidavit, stating that, “to the best of [her] recollection,” she had paid the taxes and penalties at issue.  Her affidavit also explained that she used an accounting firm to file the tax returns, that she remembered paying the taxes and penalties due, but that she did not have bank statements showing these payments.

The district court granted summary judgment for the government because, it explained, Ms. Stein did not produce any evidence documenting payments.  An Eleventh Circuit panel affirmed based on Mays v. United States, 763 F.2d 1295 (11th Cir. 1985).  In Mays, the court affirmed summary judgment for the government, holding that a taxpayer in a refund suit must not only show the government’s assessment is wrong, but also establish the “correct amount of the refund due.”  Mays further held that the taxpayer’s claim “must be substantiated by something other than tax returns, uncorroborated oral testimony, or self-serving statements.”

The Eleventh Circuit sitting en banc in Stein, however, disagreed and overruled Mays “to the extent it holds or suggests that self-serving and uncorroborated statements in a taxpayer’s affidavit cannot create an issue of material fact with respect to the correctness of the government’s assessment.”  Under Rule 56(a), summary judgment may be granted only when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and the moving party is “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  The Eleventh Circuit further held that nothing in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prohibit an affidavit from being self-serving.

Stein is a significant win for taxpayers, and it may make it easier for taxpayers to overcome the presumption of correctness that IRS assessments have enjoyed.

The Internal Revenue Code requires employers to withhold certain taxes in “a special fund in trust for the United States” (sec. 7501(a)). IRS regulations require employers to pay these trust fund taxes to the IRS quarterly. Employers who fail to pay withheld taxes to the government are personally liable for the taxes under section 6672 of the Code. In general, the government can recover unpaid taxes if (1) the employer is responsible for collecting and paying withholding taxes, and (2) the individual willfully failed to collect and pay the withholding taxes. What is key is that the IRS can recover from any responsible person, not necessarily the most responsible person.

The trust fund recovery penalty is often a trap for the unwary, including for partners and shareholders of law firms, as illustrated by Spizz v. United States, 120 A.F.T.R. 2d 2017-6719 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2017). Spizz and Todtman were shareholders of the law firm Todtman, Nachamie, Spizz & Johns, P.C., from 2009 through September 2012. The court in Spizz held that the government could hold Spizz and Todtman personally liable for the trust fund taxes the firm failed to pay between 2009 and 2012. Despite the fact that the firm was going through serious financial difficulty, the court held that both shareholders were personally liable for the trust fund taxes.

Responsible Persons

The court first turned to whether Todtman and Spizz were “responsible persons” for the firm’s payment of trust fund taxes. The court stated that the payment issue depended on whether, given the individual’s authority over the company’s financial operations, the individual could have prevented the tax delinquency.

The court found that both Todtman and Spizz were responsible persons. Todtman founded the firm, served as its president while holding one-third ownership during the relevant periods and exercised authority over the firm’s finances. Although Spizz did not make financial decisions to the same extent as Todtman, the court stated that the “inquiry focuses on whether an individual could have exerted influence” to avoid tax delinquency. The court found that Spizz was also a responsible person because he held one-third of the firm’s shares and was its vice president.

Willfulness

The second element of tax payment liability under section 6672 is willfulness. A person willfully fails to pay withholding taxes if payment is made to other creditors while knowing that withholding taxes are due. The court found that Todtman was aware of the firm’s responsibility to pay trust fund taxes, and that the firm was paying other creditors before the IRS. While the trust fund taxes were still due, Todtman signed checks on behalf of the firm to disburse funds for payroll and payments to creditors.

The court also held that Spizz willfully failed to remit trust fund taxes. Although he did not learn of the firm’s tax liability until June 2010, he failed to apply the firm’s unencumbered assets to the firm’s tax liability when he found out about it. The court held that this was sufficient to establish willfulness for the pre-June 2010 period. After June 2010, when Spizz became aware of the firm’s tax liability, the court held that he could no longer maintain a reasonable belief that other members of the firm would timely pay its trust fund taxes. Thus, Spizz could not claim that he did not willfully withhold trust fund taxes.

In Mission Funding Alpha, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently held that the statute of limitations for a corporation to file a refund claim in Pennsylvania begins to run when the corporate tax return is due, not when the return is actually filed.

Background

The issue before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was whether the three-year statute of limitations for a corporate taxpayer to file a refund claim begins when the tax is paid or when the annual return is filed.  Corporations like Mission Funding Alpha that are subject to franchise taxes must pay estimated taxes at the end of every quarter.  Any remaining franchise tax liability must be paid when the corporation files its annual return.  If the corporation overpays its estimated taxes, it may file a refund claim.  The refund claim, however, must be made within three years of “the actual payment of the tax.”

Mission Funding Alpha filed its Pennsylvania franchise tax return on September 19, 2008 – after the due date.  It overpaid its estimated franchise taxes, however, so on September 16, 2011, Mission Funding Alpha filed a claim for refund with the Pennsylvania Board of Appeals.  The Board of Appeals, however, dismissed the claim as untimely because it was filed more than three years after April 15, 2008, the due date for the return.  Mission Funding Alpha appealed, arguing that the statute of limitations is three years from the date the return is filed.

Commonwealth Court Decision

The Commonwealth Court agreed with Mission Funding Alpha.  The court held that whether a refund claim is timely depends on the meaning of “the actual payment of tax.”  It explained that “the common and approved usage of the phrase ‘actual payment’ means the delivering of money in the acceptance and performance of an obligation.”  The court noted that corporations must pay estimated taxes and make final payments of taxes due with their annual corporate returns.  According to the court, a corporate taxpayer makes its “final” tax payment only when it files its annual return.  Thus, the court reasoned that a corporation’s franchise tax liability is not established until it files its annual return and “the actual payment of the tax” does not happen until the annual return is filed.

Supreme Court Decision

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court disagreed and reversed the Commonwealth Court.  The Court explained that “the actual payment of the tax” happened on April 15, 2008, the date the tax was due and payable, and when the Pennsylvania Department of Revenue accepted Mission Funding Alpha’s estimated payments and credits for its 2007 liability.  Importantly, the Court also held that, when a return is filed late, the triggering event for determining when the statute of limitations begins to run for a refund claim is not when the return is filed.  Thus, the Court concluded that Mission Funding Alpha’s refund claim was not timely because the three-year refund period ended before the claim was filed on September 16, 2011.

Consequences

As a result of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision, the statute of limitations for refund claims in Pennsylvania is significantly different than many other states.

We have all heard the old proverb “if it’s too good to be true, then it probably is.” In the tax world, this proverb might as well be referred to as the economic substance doctrine. Generally, taxpayers are free to structure their business transactions in a manner of their choosing. However, the economic substance doctrine permits a court to disregard a transaction for Federal income tax purposes if the transaction has no effect other than generating an income tax loss.  In the case of Smith v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2017-218, the taxpayers violated this doctrine by trying to transform cash and securities into a loss through a series of transfers involving an S corporation and a limited partnership.

The Plan

In Smith v. Commissioner, Mr. Smith retired from National Coupling in 2009. Upon retirement, he received a bonus and total employee compensation of approximately $664,000. Mr. Smith’s financial adviser referred him to a tax and estate planning attorney (who was also a CPA) for tax planning services. With the intention of offsetting the compensation income Mr. Smith received from National Coupling, the attorney recommended the following tax planning structure:

  • In 2009, Mr. Smith and his wife (the “taxpayers”) would create an S corporation (wholly owned by the taxpayers) and a family limited partnership.
  • The S corporation (along with a management company) would own the family limited partnership.
  • The taxpayers would transfer cash and marketable securities to the S corporation. The S corporation, in turn, would immediately transfer the cash and marketable securities to the family limited partnership.
  • The S corporation would dissolve in 2009 (the same year it was created). Upon dissolution, the S corporation would distribute limited partnership interests in the family limited partnership to the taxpayers.
  • The fair market value of the distributed partnership interests would be discounted for lack of marketability and lack of control, generating a tax loss equal to the difference between the fair market value of the discounted partnership interests that were distributed over the cash and marketable securities the S corporation transferred to the family limited partnership.

The taxpayers agreed to the structure, and in 2009 they transferred a total of approximately $1.8 million in cash and marketable securities to a newly formed S corporation. The S corporation transferred an approximately equal amount to the newly created family limited partnership. At the end of 2009, the taxpayers and the attorney dissolved the S corporation. In the dissolution, the S corporation transferred a 49% limited partnership interest to each Mr. and Mrs. Smith. The attorney determined that the fair market value of the distributed partnership interests were approximately $1.1 million after discounting the value for lack of marketability and lack of control. The S corporation reported a loss of approximately $700,000 ($1.1 million in gross receipts (equal to the discounted value of the distributed partnership interests) less $1.8 million cost of goods sold (equal to the cash and marketable securities transferred to the family limited partnership)).

The Problem

The S corporation did not have any business activity whatsoever. It did not have a bank account, did not issue stock certificates, did not keep minutes of meetings, and did not follow corporate formalities. The S corporation existed solely to generate an artificial tax loss to offset Mr. Smith’s income. Consequently, the Court determined that the economic substance doctrine prevented the taxpayers from claiming the loss.

The Kicker

The IRS also asserted that the taxpayers were liable for a $125,000 accuracy-related penalty for a substantial understatement of tax. Taxpayers have a defense to accuracy-related penalties for reasonable reliance on the advice of a tax professional if they can prove three elements: (1) the taxpayer reasonably believed that the professional was a competent adviser with sufficient expertise to justify reliance, (2) the taxpayer provided necessary and accurate information to the adviser, and (3) the taxpayer actually relied in good faith on the adviser’s judgment. Further, due care does not require that the taxpayer challenge his or her attorney’s advice or independently investigate its propriety. Surely, the taxpayers would be able to establish that they reasonably relied on the faulty advice of their attorney, right? The Court determined that the taxpayers proved the first two elements of the defense, but not the third. What was the taxpayers’ fatal flaw? The Court thought they lied during trial. In the Court’s own words:

“They understood, early in the process, that [the S corporation] would be organized and dissolved in 2009 but continued to represent, even at trial, that [the S corporation] had a business purpose. This is not acting in good faith. They knew from the beginning that [the S corporation] would not last past 2009, it did not have a genuine business purpose, and its sole purpose was tax avoidance. That knowledge alone negates a reliance defense.”

Consequently, the Court determined that the taxpayers were liable for the accuracy-related penalty.

We highly recommend that taxpayers understand every aspect of transactions they enter into, especially when targeted to tax planning.  If a proposal seems too complicated or if you can’t make sense of something, get a second opinion, or…RUN!

Tax Court

The issue before the Tax Court in Huzella v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2017-210, centered around a coin business on eBay, and whether the petitioner, Thomas Huzella, could substantiate his cost of goods sold and expense deductions for his business.

The petitioner had been collecting coins as far back as 1958.  The problem was that the petitioner did not keep records to establish the basis in any of his coins.  In 2013, the petitioner actively bought and sold coins on eBay and was paid through PayPal.  PayPal issued the petitioner a Form 1099-K, Payment Card and Third Party Network Transactions, which reflected the payments he received from PayPal.  The petitioner earned $37,000 from almost 400 separate transactions in 2013.  But he also incurred eBay fees and Paypal fees, as well as packaging and shipping costs.

When he filed his tax return, the petitioner did not report anything on his Schedule C, and the IRS audited his return and issued a notice of deficiency.  The IRS alleged that the petitioner had unreported income of $37,000 from his eBay business and asserted penalties.  At trial, the IRS conceded that the petitioner was engaged in a trade or business in 2013.  The IRS also conceded that the petitioner was entitled to deduct the eBay and PayPal fees, and the Tax Court held that he was entitled to deduct $700 of postage and packaging costs.  The petitioner conceded that he earned – but did not report – gross proceeds of $37,000 from his eBay business.

The court then turned to the cost of goods sold issue.  Taxpayers are required to substantiate any amount they claim as cost of goods sold, and they must maintain sufficient records.  If a taxpayer with insufficient records, however, proves he incurred expenses but cannot substantiate the exact amount, the Tax Court may, in certain circumstances, estimate the amount.

Here, the Tax Court (and the petitioner) relied on the Cohan decision.  See Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930).  In that case, the taxpayer was an actor, playwright, and producer who spent large sums travelling and entertaining actors, employees, and critics.  Although Cohan did not keep a record of his spending on travel and entertainment, he estimated that he incurred $55,000 in expenses over several years.

The Board of Tax Appeals, now the Tax Court, disallowed these deductions in full based on Cohan’s lack of supporting documentation.  On appeal, however, the Second Circuit concluded that Cohan’s testimony established that legitimate deductible expenses had been incurred, holding that “the Board should make as close an approximation as it can, bearing heavily if it chooses upon the taxpayer whose inexactitude is of his own making.”  The Cohan rule has been followed by the Tax Court and other federal courts in numerous decisions.

The petitioner in Huzella did not have any records to establish his cost or bases in the coins.  He purchased some coins and inherited others.  But the Tax Court relied on Cohan and, after evaluating the evidence and the petitioner’s testimony, held that the petitioner could substantiate a cost of goods sold of $12,000.  Thus, the petitioner had taxable income of just under $20,600 (gross receipts of $37,000, less cost of goods sold and deductions).

Today, the Tax Court issued its opinion in Feinberg v. Commissioner, a case involving an ongoing and hard fought battle between the IRS and a medical marijuana dispensary, Total Health Concepts, LLC.  The IRS examined THC’s 2009 through 2011 tax returns.  As a result of the examination, the IRS adjusted the member taxpayers’ returns to reflect a cost of goods sold allowance in excess of the amount originally claimed on the return by reclassifying expenses that were originally claimed as below-the-line expenses.  However, the IRS also disallowed expenses not reclassified as cost of goods sold.  Accordingly, the IRS computed deficiencies on the member’s individual tax returns.

During earlier phases of this case, the taxpayer argued that the Commissioner did not have jurisdiction to administratively determine whether petitioners committed a federal crime outside of the U.S. tax code, that section 280E as applied by the Commissioner is unconstitutional as it violates petitioners rights against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, and that section 280E exceeds the authority granted to Congress under the Sixteenth Amendment of the Constitution.  The Tax Court denied the taxpayer’s request for summary judgment and compelled them to respond to IRS discovery requests.  The taxpayer’s sought a writ of mandamus, seeking review of the Tax Court’s order compelling them to produce documents.  The Tenth Circuit determined that if the discovery request harmed them, the proper time to address that harm would be after the Tax Court case was fully resolved.  As a result, the taxpayer’s case proceeded to trial.

At trial, the taxpayer did not submit documentation to substantiate the cost of goods sold allowance or the ordinary and necessary business expenses.  Instead, an expert report was submitted to substantiate a cost of goods sold allowance in excess of what the IRS allowed during the examination.  The Tax Court ruled that the expert report was unreliable because it contained statements which failed to refer to underlying source information, failed to include underlying source information which the expert relied upon, and failed to include sufficient information and data to support the report’s conclusions.  As a result, the expert report was inadmissible.

Next, the court looked to evidence which would support a higher cost of goods sold allowance than the allowance determined in the IRS report.  Without documentation, the court concluded that the IRS determination of cost of goods sold would stand.  Further, because there was no substantiation of ordinary and necessary business expenses claimed under Section 162, the court determined that it did not need to address the application of Section 280E (the code section which disallows ordinary and necessary business deductions for businesses trafficking in controlled substances).

What is the lesson here?  This case provides no guidance on the limits that will be applied to cannabis companies in determining cost of goods sold.  Rather, this case tells us that a cannabis company should prepare for an IRS examination the same way any other taxpayer should, by maintaining documentation to support the deductions claimed on the return and by provided that documentation when the IRS requests it.  This is especially true in this case, where the court determined that “there was not enough evidence in the record to make a finding of fact that THC sold medical marijuana.”  Based on this statement, if the taxpayer would have substantiated its below-the-line expenses, they would not have been subject to Section 280E, which would have been a huge win for the taxpayer.

TIGTA recently released a report discusses their audit of the IRS’s estate and gift tax examination procedures.  TIGTA made eight recommendations of changes to the estate and gift tax examination process.  The bulk of TIGTA’s recommendations address the informal processes, lack of consistency, and unknown effectiveness of the estate and gift tax examination procedures.

One of the more significant findings of the report is that while the examination division proposed over $577 million of estate and gift tax deficiencies for FY 2016, only $98 million of those deficiencies were sustained after cases were considered by IRS Appeals.  The Examination division attributed this statistic to the fact that the Examination division proposes alternative deficiencies in order to prevent being whipsawed.  However, the Examination division could not separately identify the amount of deficiencies that were attributable to these alternative positions.  TIGTA highlighted that the Government could be subject to suits for attorneys’ fees pursuant to Section 7430 if the positions set forth in the notices of deficiency were not substantially justified.  TIGTA recommended that Examination division develop written guidance “on the circumstances in which it is advisable to propose and issue notices of deficiency in estate and gift tax examinations that contain alternative positions.”

Other highlights from the report include:

  • there is one gatekeeper who decides whether or not to route a case for examination and how to prioritize cases;
  • there is no quality review process;
  • unlike the process for selecting income tax returns for examination, the process of selecting estate and gift tax examinations for examination is based minimal written guidance and involves almost no objective procedures, but instead relies on human involvement and judgment; and
  • procedures for documenting case selection, examination documentation and managerial review either did not exist or if they did exist were not followed as closely as they should be.

TIGTA’s report can be accessed here.

The President has declared a major disaster in the State of Texas. The declaration permits the IRS to postpone certain deadlines for taxpayers who reside or have a business in the disaster area.

Individuals who reside or have a business in the following counties may qualify for tax relief: Aransas, Austin, Batrop, Bee, Brazoria, Calhoun, Chambers, Colorado, DeWitt, Fayette, Fort Bend, Galveston, Goliad, Gonzales, Hardin, Harris, Jackson, Jasper, Jefferson, Karnes, Kleberg, Lavaca, Lee, Liberty, Matagorda, Montgomery, Newton, Nueces, Orange, Polk, Refugio, Sabine, San Jacinto, San Patricio, Tyler, Victoria, Walker, Waller and Wharton.

Taxpayers not in the covered disaster area, but whose records necessary to meet a deadline are in the disaster area are also entitled to relief. In addition, all relief workers affiliated with a recognized government or philanthropic organization assisting in the relief activities in the disaster area and any individual visiting the covered disaster area who was killed or injured as a result of the disaster are entitled to relief.

The IRS gives the affected taxpayers until January 30, 2018 to file most tax returns (including individual, corporate, and estate and trust income tax returns; partnership returns, S corporation returns, and trust returns; estate, gift, and generation-skipping transfer tax returns; and employment and certain excise tax returns), that have either an original or extended due date occurring on or after August 23, 2017, and before January 31, 2018. This includes taxpayers who had a valid extension to file their 2016 return that was due to run out on October 16, 2017. It also includes the quarterly estimated income tax payments originally due on September 15, 2017 and January 16, 2018, and the quarterly payroll and excise tax returns normally due on October 31, 2017. In addition, penalties on payroll and excise tax deposits due on or after August 23, 2017, and before September 7, 2017, will be abated as long as the deposits were made by September 7, 2017.

If an affected taxpayer receives a late filing or late payment penalty notice from the IRS that has an original or extended filing, payment or deposit due date that falls within the postponement period, the taxpayer should call the telephone number on the notice to have the IRS abate the penalty.

Casualty Losses

Affected taxpayers in a federally declared disaster area have the option of claiming disaster-related casualty losses on their federal income tax return for either the year in which the event occurred, or the prior year. Individuals may deduct personal property losses that are not covered by insurance or other reimbursements.